Monday, August 31, 2009
Power: a true test of character
Friday, August 28, 2009
Should 11-year old girls be mandated to get HPV vaccine?
The manufacturer of Gardasil, in the name of public health, is calling for the government to mandate this as yet another vaccination required for school entry. This may make sense in a third-world country, where access to Pap smears is poor and the chances of using a condom are culturally slim, but in the US this seems over-the-top. How about instead, in the name of public health, halting the confusion of conflicting messages about sexual activity?
I know that once my kids are teens I will have very little to say about how they exercise their judgment. What I can hope for is that through honest dialogue I am preparing them now for the decisions they will be making on their own. One of the lessons we emphasize is that actions have consequences. Pushing Gardasil as the solution to a culturally created problem takes personal and societal responsibilities out of the equation. Yes, we may avoid a few cases of cervical cancer and even deaths from it, but we will have forgone the opportunity to teach our children to exercise their personal choices, responsibility and common sense. Moreover, we will be promoting further the culture of "a pill for everything", a philosophy that has brought our healthcare "system" to the brink of bankruptcy and our nation to unprecedented rates of bad behavior.
In view of the recent questions about the vaccine's risk-benefit profile, caution is needed more than ever. Vaccines should be mandated for highly infectious diseases spread via casual contact, likely to cause unmitigatable and frequent morbidity and mortality, and only if their benefits outweigh their risks. Gardasil fails this entire formula: HPV is pretty hard to get, cervical cancer is nearly 100% curable if detected early, and the vaccine's risk-benefit profile is in question. It is entirely clear that HPV is not smallpox. Let's stop pushing this false panacea on our kids and get back to teaching them the valuable skills and judgment that will serve them well as good people and responsible citizens of our nation.
Thursday, August 27, 2009
Notes from a pandemic
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
H1N1 predictions demystified
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
How technology can help contain H1N1
Monday, August 24, 2009
H1N1: Why we are unprepared
Sunday, August 23, 2009
Saturday, August 22, 2009
PLoS: estimates of respiratory failure from H1N1 in US
Input Parameters | Estimate* | Source |
US population | 307,024,641 | [6] |
Estimated attack rate | 15% (6%-24%) | [2] |
Hospitalization rate, relative to attack rate | 6% (2%-10%) | 6% = CA experience, personal communication 2% = assumption 10% = [5] |
ARF rate (relative to hospitalization) | 12% (6%-18%) | 12% = [5] 6% and 18% = assumption |
Mortality rate (relative to ARF) | 58% (40%-80%) | 58% = [5] 40% and 80% =assumption |
| | |
Outcomesò | Mean estimate | 95% CI |
Total cases | 46,053,696 | 36,937,583-55,094,920 |
Number hospitalizations | 2,763,222 | 2,034,413-3,585,032 |
ARF cases | 331,587 | 227,866-454,001 |
Deaths | 192,320 | 125,945-276,482 |
*Each input parameter was assumed to be normally distributed
òOutcome estimates and corresponding confidence intervals are based on Monte Carlo simulations, 10,000 trials for each outcome
CA = California, ARF = acute respiratory failure, CI = confidence interval
Friday, August 21, 2009
The highest form of patriotism
Thursday, August 20, 2009
What would you recommend?
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
Death and taxes
A school yard bully
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Society of Critical Care Medicine P4P implementation guidelines
Society of Critical Care Medicine pay-for-performance implementation guidelines
The goal of a P4P program is to improve patient care.
Quality measures must be evidence-based and be accurate indicators of patient care and outcomes.
Quality measures must be developed, maintained, and reviewed in an open and transparent process.
Quality measures must be under the direct control of the intensivist physician.
Before implementation, P4P programs must be pilot-tested to ensure valid data collection and accuracy.
Performance measures involving outcomes (i.e., mortality, morbidity) must be risk adjusted.
P4P programs must demonstrate improved quality of patient care as a result of implementation for outcome measures.
Quality measures must be reviewed at least every 2 years.
The best programs would also provide expert opinion and discussion with suggestions for improvement.
Physician participation is voluntary.
Physicians must be able to opt-in or opt-out of a P4P program.
Opting-out must not have negative economic consequences.
Physician participation in P4P must not be linked to participation in other health plans or governmental programs.
Programs must be phased in to allow physician participation.
Physicians must be notified at least 6 months in advance, in writing, regarding new P4P opportunities, changes in existing programs, or rewards.
Data collecting must be simple and valid.
Patient privacy and security of all data must be protected at all times consistent with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
Data collection and reporting must be simple and reliable.
Audit systems must be implemented to ensure accuracy of data.
Physicians must be reimbursed for any added costs incurred as a result of participating in the program.
Performance data should be aggregated and analyzed by an independent entity, audited by an independent third party, and reviewed by the reporting physician or group with all costs paid for by the program.
Feedback of performance data should be provided monthly and compared against historical norms, peers, and performance targets in a clear and easy-to-understand format.
Confidentiality and public reporting.
Physicians should be assessed in groups or across systems rather than individually, if possible.
Physicians must be able to see preliminary ratings and given an opportunity to improve before ratings are publicly released.
There must be a formal appeal process before public release of ratings.
Results of P4P programs must not be used for health plan credentialing, hospital privileges, licensure, or board certification.
Individual physician P4P data must remain confidential and nondiscoverable in legal proceedings.
Use of IT should be encouraged, but not required for participation in P4P programs.
Programs must not favor physician practices by capabilities in IT.
Programs must not require practices to purchase health plan-specific IT programs.
Programs must be designed to minimize financial and IT barriers to physician participation.
Programs must provide tools to facilitate participation.
Programs must provide funds to encourage the use of IT.
P4P programs should be based on rewards and not penalties.
P4P programs should utilize new money funded by using a portion of the projected health plan savings.
There should be no reduction in existing fees paid to physicians as a result of implementing a P4P program.
P4P programs must provide additional incentives to purchase and utilize IT and electronic medical records.
Rewards must be greater than the costs associated with participation.
Rewards should be of a significant magnitude to encourage desired behaviors and support continuous improvement.
Rewards should be provided for both achieving program goals and performance improvement.
Ranking with other physicians participating in the program or groups should not occur, and rewards must not be based on rank.
Monday, August 17, 2009
Confusion: prescription for a big mess
Healthcare, etc. now on BMJ blogs
Sunday, August 16, 2009
The sick and the dead
Saturday, August 15, 2009
Pit bull in lipstick
Friday, August 14, 2009
Blogger or WordPress?
Waste in healthcare, from PWC
PricewaterhouseCooper's Health Research Institute report on wasted healthcare spending
Key findings:
Wasteful spending in the health system has been calculated at up to
$1.2 trillion of the $2.2 trillion spent nationally, more than half of all
health spending.
• Spending can be classified into three waste “baskets”: behavioral, clinical
and operational. These baskets cross all of the health sectors and include
consumers, government and industry.
• The top three areas of wasted spending are defensive medicine ($210
billion annually), inefficient claims processing (up to $210 billion annually),
and care spent on preventable conditions related to obesity and
overweight ($200 billion annually).
• Eight out of 10 consumers surveyed by PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Health
Research Institute (HRI) said that inefficiency in the healthcare system is
not only driving up healthcare costs, but impacting the quality of care.
• Consumers see themselves, government and the industry at fault for
wasteful spending. For example, 86% of consumers surveyed by HRI
agreed that patients going to emergency rooms for non-emergency care
drives up healthcare costs. Two-thirds said that they personally had
received excessive medical testing.
• When U.S. consumers were asked why they believe the U.S. healthcare
system has inefficiencies that have not been resolved, nearly half said
“because it is not a priority for the government.” More than a third said it was
due to the health industry not being willing to change business practices.
• Key barriers to eliminating waste are culture, politics, funding and
incentives, and lack of a coordinated focus.
• Solving inefficiencies means developing system-wide incentives to
encourage partnerships and networks that work toward shared value.
Universal healthcare is terrorist recruitment tool
Unintended consequences
Thursday, August 13, 2009
A narrowing window of opportunity
Catching up on last week’s journals, two seemingly unrelated pieces caught my eye: one in JAMA and the other in the New England Journal of Medicine. The one in JAMA talked about how the Israeli health system deals with mass casualty-related surge capacity, and the one in the NEJM focused on how growth of corporate medicine can benefit healthcare in the US. Juxtaposing these two papers made for an interesting exercise in gap analysis.